I was quite struck by the audacity (and seeming ignorance) of the Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace - I cannot honestly imagine how Barlow thinks he can support his claims. Since ISPs are based in particular locations in real space, and particular countries have their own ccTLD that identifies them (not to mention, as Lessig points out, ISP addresses and other data), it is clear that particular countries have jurisdiction not only over users, but also over software companies that enable internet access. Further, as Dibbell points out in his anecdote, the emotional responses of human beings are clearly affected and occasionally provoked by events that happen in cyberspace. In response to especially severe provocations, there are repercussions by the offended parties, as illustratedin both Dibbell's and Froomkin's pieces. Perhaps the best way to view cyberspace is as an extension of a person's physical persona, but at the same time not the same as the person's physical body. That way, norms that apply to personal conduct may be enforced, and information collected about the person over the internet may be used to paint the proper context for judging the appropriate response - the terrorist who proclaims his plans to bomb a building can be prosecuted, while the Twitterer who makes jokes about such material can receive a stern talking to instead of facing similar consequences. In this sense, cases involving purely virtual offenses - such as Dibbell's - could be enforced by the appropriate authority, namely, the administrators of the forum.
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Also, my question: how should we imagine the relationship between the "real self" that is the user and the "virtual self/selves" that the user propagates online? Are they really that distinct, as some of our readings suggest?
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