Derivative Works and Transformations

What struck me most in the past week’s texts on digital copyright is the way the way certain people treated and perceived creativity. Digital copyright law protects an individual’s rights to their own work and to the derivatives of their works, or as Lessig describes, anything which their original work may inspire. In using that definition, then is not every creative work we produce a ‘derivative work? Doesn’t the woman who wrote Twilight owe royalties to Bram Stoker? And Bram Stoker to other writers of his time? (duration put aside). So I take issue with what a ‘derivative work’ is because is not all of our ‘original’ creative work is a synthesis of previous creative ideas and works? That said, however, I do take issue with blatant commercial transformations of my work without permission (if I wrote a book, you should not be able to make and sell a movie about it) - so another question is, where can we draw such a line between what is acceptable transformation and what is not?

Another issue is duration: Lessig makes a compelling case in Eldred v. Ashcroft that adding extensions, even if finite, in practice undermine the spirit of the Copyright clause trying to make sure that protections are temporary, because Sonny Bono Bill Redux could easily come out and tack on another 70 years of copyright protections. The issue lies with the vagueness of the Constitution’s requirement that copyright protections be temporary - what period of time is sufficient?