False Positives

As you probably have figured out by now, I am less offended than most by government intrusion into our private lives. So it is at the risk of sounsing hypocritical that I wish to state my qualms with the proliferation of government database technology. The dissent in US v Ellison worries that heavy monitoring of the people all but eliminates anonymity, and may even chill speech and usher in a totalitarian government. Indeed, after 9/11 the American people have been subjected to random searches with increasing frequency when they travel. So long as psychologically invasive practices that may be acceptable in an airport, like metal detectors and bomb sniffing dogs, do not become the regular tools of highway patrolmen, I am relatively comfortable with a policeman's ability to run a car's plates to check for outstanding violations. This is a useful, expedient, and non-invasive practice. However, a number of the cases we read for this week bring up an important downside to law enforcement's reliance on database technology: the possibility of false positives.

I have the unlucky privilege of sharing the name with someone who has been placed on the national "No Fly List". What this means is that whenever I fly I am subject to extra scrutiny by the ticketing agent; more than once I have nearly missed my flight as a result. Even after registering with the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program a few years ago, I continue to have problems. While flying back from Florida with my family last week, an airline representative actually boarded our plane at the terminal and delayed takeoff in order to verify my ID in greater detail. If the Wikipedia page is to be trusted, I am far from the only person who has the problem. There are over a million names on the No Fly list currently, which means there are millions more false positives; each of us is guilty until proven innocent. And while I don't blame the government for trying to keep our skies safe, I am tired of being scrutinized like a criminal every time I check in for a flight.

The problem of false positives is not limited to air travel, but by explaining my own experience I hope I have demonstrated some of the risks at play as law enforcement becomes increasingly reliant on digital databases. Computers are very good at parsing and conveying information, but they lack common sense. No matter what the computer says, a college student on spring break with his family does not pose a security threat. Although cases like US v Sokolow have shied away from allowing law enforcement officers too much discretion in their actions, I believe that discretion can be very much a positive in certain circumstances. Reliance on databases can be useful, but a little common sense can also go a long way.